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Penalty Shot: The European Union's 
Application of Competition Law to the 
Bosman Ruling 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fifteen countries comprising the European Union (EU), foot-
halF is more than a sport: it is a cultural institution.2 Along with its 
cultural importance, European football is a multi-billion dollar indus-
try.3 In Europe, national football associations and clubs receive billions 
of dollars yearly from the sale of television rights, advertising, endorse-
ments, ticket sales, and merchandising contracts.4 
On December 12, 1995, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) sent 
shock waves through the European football community with its ruling 
in Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman. 5 
The court's ruling effectively abolished the transfer fee system as well 
as rules limiting the number of foreign players a team may field. 6 The 
ECJ held that the transfer fee system and the rules limiting the number 
of foreign players a team may field violated Article 48 of the Treaty of 
Rome, which regulates freedom of movement. 7 However, the ECJ 
found no reason to address Bosman's claim that the transfer fee system 
and the foreign player limitations violated Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome, which address competition.8 
In violation of the court's order, the Union of European Football 
Associations9 (UEFA) neglected to abolish the transfer fee system or 
1 "Football, .. as used in this Note, refers to the sport known as soccer in the United States. 
2 See Marning Edition: European Court Reverses Limit on Foreign Soccer Trades (National Public 
Radio, May 21, 1996) [hereinafter Marning Edition]. 
3 See Peter Lansley, 1V Money Highlights Club Divide, INDEPENDENT, June 8, 1996, at 31; Morning 
Edition, supra note 2. 
4 See Morning Edition, supra note 2. 
5 Case 415/93, Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1996 CEC 
(CCH) 38, 118 (1996) [hereinafter Bosman]. 
6 See id. at 136. 
7 ld.; TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN EcONOMIC CoMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 48,298 
U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter TREATY OF RoME). 
8 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134. 
9 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) is the European governing body for foot-
ball. 
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change its rules regarding foreign player limitations.10 In response, 
Karl Van Miert, EU Commissioner of Competition, threatened UEFA 
with fines for violation of EU competition laws, even though the ECJ 
neglected to rule on the impact of the competition laws.U Eventually, 
under pressure from the EU, UEFA reluctantly adopted the ECJ's 
ruling, by abolishing the transfer fee requirement and the foreign 
player restrictions.12 
In the ECJ's opinion in Bosman the question of whether the practices 
of the national football associations and UEFA violated EU competi-
tion law was left unresolved.13 Instead, the ECJ relied solely on Article 
48 to invalidate transfer fee systems and foreign player limitations. 14 
But, when enforcing the court's ruling, Van Miert applied the compe-
tition laws to force UEFA to abide by the ECJ's ruling. 15 
Section I of this Note provides a background of the EU's policy on 
competition. Section II examines the ECJ's ruling in Bosman. Section 
III analyzes the application of EU competition laws to Bosman. This 
Note concludes that while the ECJ did not rule on the applicability of 
EU competition law in Bosman, the practices of the national football 
association and UEFA violate Article 85. Furthermore, the events sub-
sequent to the court's ruling in Bosman highlight the need for a court 
of finality, as well as the need to resolve all issues brought before it. 
I. EuROPEAN UNION CoMPETITION LAw 
A. Policy: Free Market 
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a 
Common Market and progressively approximating the eco-
nomic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious development of economic activi-
ties, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased sta-
10 See Commission on Collision Course with UEFA Over Bosman Ruling, EuR. REP.,Jan. 20, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 8661384; UEFA Launches Attack on EU, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 27, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 4053221; Van Miert and Flynn Lay Down the Law for UEFA, EuR. REP., Feb. 
3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8661713. A study by an English firm of accountants states that the 
clubs of the English first division spent nearly £51,000,000 on transfer fees in the 1992/93 season. 
Bosman, 1996 CEC (CCH) at 53. 
11 Julie Wolf, EC Threatens Ruling Bodies with Fines, GuARDIAN, Jan. 20, 1996, at 18. 
12 Stephen Bates, UEFA Finally Toes the Free-Agent Line, GuARDIAN, Mar. 5, 1996, at 22. 
1 ~ Suzanne Perry, Competition Aspects of Bosman Case Come to Fore, Reuters, Jan. 18, 1996. 
14 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134. 
15 See Perry, supra note 13. 
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bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between its Member States.16 
169 
To achieve the ends set out in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the 
EU created a single internal market.17 In an ideal setting, vigorous 
competition among buyers and sellers forces prices to their lowest 
possible levels, with the increased responsiveness to buyers' demands.18 
The EU's competition laws are intended to preserve open and free 
trade by protecting against anti-competitive tactics, ensuring the main-
tenance of an open market, preserving equal access to the market, and 
providing equal opportunity within the market.19 Practices including 
price fixing, collusion, or market sharing restrict trade by closing mar-
kets to competitors, controlling supply, or artificially inflating prices 
and are therefore prohibited based on the EU competition laws.20 
Beyond maintaining a free market, EU competition laws work to 
promote the integration of national markets.21 This goal is vitally im-
portant to the development of a single market in the EU.22 Therefore, 
the competition laws work to eliminate protectionist programs and 
encourage the creation of an open market.23 
B. Law: Treaty of Rome Articles 85 and 86 
The Treaty of Rome serves as the primary source of EU competition 
law. 24 The underlying principle of EU competition law is articulated in 
Article 3(f),"[T]he activities of the Community shall include ... the 
establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be dis-
torted in the Common Market. "25 The substantive competition law is 
contained in Articles 85 through 94 of the Treaty of Rome.26 
16'fREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 15. 
17 See DR. KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, 23 (4th ed. 1995). 
18 See RALPH FoLsoM, EuROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw IN A NUTSHELL 235 (1992); D.G. GoYDER, 
EC CoMPETITION LAw 9 (2d ed. 1993); F. McGowan, EC Competitiun Policy, in THE EcoNOMICS 
OF THE EuROPEAN CoMMUNITY 173 (Ali M. El-Agraa ed. 1994); RITTER ET AL., EEC CoMPETITION 
LAw A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE 3 (1991). 
19 See RITTER, supra note 18, at 3. 
20 See McGowan, supra note 18, at 17 4. 
21 RITTER, supra note 18, at 3. 
22 See id. 
2~ See id. 
24 McGowan, supra note 18, at 179; see 'TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 15, 36, 4 7-49. 
25'fREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 16. 
26 McGowan, supra note 18, at 179. 
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Article 85 is the core of the EU competition law. 27 It holds as incom-
patible with the common market "any agreements between enterprises, 
any decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices 
which are likely to affect trade between Member States .... "28 There-
fore, to be held in violation of Article 85, three elements must be 
27'fREATY OF ROME, supra note 7, at 16. 
Article 85 
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby 
be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of enterprises 
and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States and which 
have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
Common Market, in particular those consisting in: 
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; 
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional 
supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contract. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void. 
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
-any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises, 
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and 
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic 
progress while reserving to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and which: 
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the 
attainment of the above objectives; 
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial proportion 
of the goods concerned. 
Article 86 
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby, action by 
one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the Common 
Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common 
Market and shall hereby be prohibited. 
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or any other 
inequitable trading conditions; 
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers; 
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of additional 
supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contract. 
'TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-49. 
28 Id. at 47-48. 
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satisfied.29 First, the violator must be an "enterprise" or an "association 
of enterprises. "30 An "enterprise" is defined as an entity which is en-
gaged in business activities.31 Second, there must be an "agreement."32 
An "agreement" is found where two or more parties reach a consensus 
between themselves, or through a third party, which dictates a pattern 
of commercial action.33 Third, the agreement must have an apprecia-
ble impact on trade between Member States.34 
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits an enterprise from abus-
ing a dominant market position which affects trade between Member 
States.35 A dominant position is created when a firm has the power to 
behave independently.36 Independence is achieved when the firm does 
not need to take into account competitors, purchasers, or suppliers.37 
This independence must be viewed in light of the size of the market 
in which the business is involved.38 A dominant position may be ob-
tained on either the supply or demand side of the market.39 
C. Enforcement: Commission and European Court of Justice 
The competition laws are enforced by two bodies: the Commission 
and the ECJ.40 The Commission is composed of seventeen members, 
one of which, the Commissioner of Competition, is in charge of en-
forcing the competition laws.41 The Commission and the Commis-
sioner's role is to apply regulations, directives, and decisions created 
by institutions of the Community, under the Treaty of Rome.42 
In 1962, the Council of Ministers adopted Regulation 17, giving the 
Commission and the Commissioner of Competition investigatory pow-
ers, as well as the authority to determine when violations of Articles 85 
and 86 occur.43 
29 /d. 
so /d. 
SI RITTER, supra note 18, at 31. 
S2TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
ss RITTER, supra note 18, at 60. 
S4 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
S5 See id. at 48-49. 
ss FoLSOM, supra note 18, at 280-81. 
S7 Jd. 
ss See id. at 281-82. 
sg See id. at 279. 
40 See RITTER, supra note 18, at 5-6. 
41 /d. 
42Jd. 
4S See Council Regulation 17, Feb 6, 1962, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EuROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw 
C4-014 (Sweet and Maxwell, vol. IV, 1975) [hereinafter Regulation 17]. 
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The Commission and Commissioner also have the authority to ren-
der enforcement decisions, subject to judicial review by the ECJ.44 The 
enforcement decisions of the Commission and Commissioner may 
require a firm found in violation of the competition laws to discontinue 
practices which violate the EU competition laws.45 The Commission 
also has at its discretion the authority to levy substantial fines against 
firms for intentional or negligent infringement of competition law.46 
Along with the Commission, the ECJ also works to enforce compe-
tition laws, by serving as final arbiter of disputes arising under Com-
munity law.47 In its role as final arbiter the ECJ performs three primary 
functions. 48 First, the court conducts judicial review of acts of the 
European Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission 
when challenged by private parties.49 Second, it provides rulings on 
preliminary questions regarding interpretation of the Treaties. 50 Third, 
it determines whether a Member State has infringed on its obligations 
under the Treaty.51 
The ECJ is assisted by six advocates-general who act as "the embodied 
conscience of the Court. "52 The advocates-general provide an inde-
pendent review and opinion of the cases before the court.53 The Ad-
vocate-Generals' opinions are not binding on the court, but they are 
published with the ECJ's opinion in its final order.54 
44 See id. at C4-046. 
45 See id. at C4-014, C4-015, C4-016. 
46 See id. at C4-040. The fines may be substantial but not to exceed 10 percent of the turnover 
in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings found so to have participated. In 
fixing the fine, regard is to be had to the duration of the infringement and its seriousness. See 
id. 
47RITTER, supra note 18, at 6. 
48 See id. 
49 ld. 
50Jd. 
51Jd. 
52 D. LAsoK &j.W. BRIDGE, LAw AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 249 (4th 
ed. 1987). 
53 Id. at 250. 
54Jd. 
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II. THE BosMAN CAsE 
A. Facts 
Between 1988 and 1990,Jean-Marc Bosman played professional foot-
ball for R.C. Liege (Liege), a Belgian first division club.55 In 1990, Liege 
offered Bosman a new contract which reduced his salary by seventy-five 
percent.56 Bosman refused to sign this new contract, and pursuant to 
the rules of the transfer fee system,57 his name was placed on the 
"transfer list."58 Bosman's transfer fee was set at BFr 11,743,000.59 
During the compulsory transfer period, no club showed an interest 
in Bosman.60 Mter this period expired, Bosman arranged a contract 
with SA d'economie mixte sportive de !'Union Sportive du Littoral de 
Dunkerque (US Dunkerque), a French club.61 The conditions of this 
contract included payment of BFr 1,200,000 to Liege by US Dunker-
que, in exchange for receipt by US Dunkerque of a transfer certificate 
from league officials at URBSFA.62 Liege doubted US Dunkerque's 
solvency, and declined to request that URBSFA send the transfer cer-
tificate to US Dunkerque, resulting in the termination of the contract 
between Bosman and US Dunkerque.63 Liege then suspended Bosman, 
which prevented him from playing the entire season.64 
55 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 122. 
56Jd. 
57 A transfer occurs when a player moves from one club to another. These contracts may last 
between one and five years and run until June 30. Before April 26 of the last year of a player's 
contract the team must offer the player a new contract. The player is free to reject this offer, at 
which time he is placed on a list of players available for 'compulsory' transfers. Acquisition of 
players from this list requires that the acquiring club pay the selling club a transfer fee to 
compensate the selling club for the costs of training the player. The transfer fee is based on a 
formula which takes into account the player's age, experience and prior salary. The player 
remains in 'compulsory' status from May 1 to May 31. On June 1, the player moves into a period 
of 'free' transfer. During this period the acquiring club and the selling club may come to an 
agreement as to the transfer fee. If the player is unable to obtain a transfer, the original club 
must offer the player a contract with the same terms as the April 26 contract. If the player refuses, 
the club has until August 1 to suspend the player. The player, after sitting out two seasons, then 
acquires amateur status and may go to another club without payment of a transfer fee. Id. at 
ll9-20. 
58 Id. at 122. 
59Jd. 
60 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 122. 
61 Id. at 50, 122. 
62 Id. at 122. 
63Jd. 
64Jd. 
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B. European Court of justice opinion 
On April9, 1992, Bosman brought suit against R.C. Liege, URBSFA 
and UEFA seeking a declaration that the transfer rules and nationality 
clauses violated the Treaty of Rome. 65 The ECJ was asked by the Belgian 
Cour d'Appel to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
Articles 48, 85, and 86.66 The Cour d'Appel asked the ECJ to determine 
whether Articles 48, 85, and 86, "prohibit[ed] a football club from 
requiring and receiving payment of a sum of money upon the engage-
ment of one of its players who has come to the end of his contract by 
a new employing club. "67 The Cour d' Appel also asked the ECJ to 
determine whether Articles 48, 85, and 86, "prohibit[ed] the national 
and international sporting associations or federations from including 
in their respective regulations provisions restricting access of foreign 
players from the European Community to the competitions which they 
organized. "68 
The ECJ held that the transfer system restricts the freedom of move-
ment of players who wish to pursue their career in another Member 
State by preventing them from leaving the clubs to which they belong, 
even after their contracts have expired.69 A player's present team is 
given an unfair advantage in resigning the player because they do not 
have to pay a transfer fee. 70 This type of practice was held to serve as 
a barrier to freedom of movement, and therefore a violation of Article 
48.71 
The court then addressed the applicability of Article 48 to rules 
limiting the number of foreign players a football team may have on 
the field at one time. 72 Article 48 prohibits discrimination based on 
nationality, stating that freedom of movement "shall involve the aboli-
tion of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the 
Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other work-
ing conditions. "73 The court held that though there was no restriction 
on the number of foreign players a team may employ, rules preventing 
65 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 123. 
66 Id. at 118. 
67 Id. at 124. 
68 Jd. 
69 See id. at 130, 132. 
7o See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 130-31. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 132. 
7STREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 36. 
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a team from fielding more than three foreign players limits a player's 
employment opportunities.74 The court held that this limitation con-
stituted discrimination, and therefore is subject to Article 48 restric-
tions.75 
USFRBA and UEFA argued in opposition to this ruling, citing non-
economic grounds for applying the foreign player limitations. 76 These 
arguments included the need to field teams which are representative 
of the local population, the need to develop a local pool of talent from 
which national teams can be selected, and the need to maintain a 
competitive balance between clubs.77 The court countered, claiming 
that the exemption for the protection of nationality need only be 
applied to the fielding of national teams. 78 The court held that the 
protection of nationalism is not an applicable argument in regard to 
professional football in Europe.79 Football clubs are already comprised 
partly of foreign players. 8° Furthermore, players playing abroad remain 
eligible to play for their national team. 81 Finally, the court held that 
the elimination of the nationality restrictions will serve to increase the 
opportunity for employment by creating a larger employment mar-
ket.82 
The ECJ chose not to rule on the application of Article 85 and 86 
to the transfer fee system and the nationality restrictions. 83 The ECJ 
cited sufficient grounds under Article 48 to invalidate transfer fee 
systems and foreign player limitations without considering Articles 85 
or 86.84 The court did not dismiss these claims, but merely chose not 
to rule on them in the Bosman case. 85 
C. Aftermath of Bosman Ruling 
The ECJ's decision in Bosman did not end the conflict between 
UEFA and the EU, but rather sparked more debate as UEFA refused 
74 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 133. 
75 /d. at 132-33. 
76 /d. at 133. 
77 /d. 
78 See id. 
79 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 133-34. 
80 /d. 
81 /d. at 134. 
82 See id. 
8~ /d. at 134. 
84 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134. 
85 See id. 
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to abide by the court's ruling.86 UEFA expressed its intention not to 
make any immediate changes to its European transfer rules and for-
eign player restrictions87 despite the court's call for immediate imple-
mentation.88 UEFA argued that athletics should be given a special 
exemption under the EEC Treaty.89 
UEFA cited two specific reasons for hesitating to abolish the transfer 
fee system.9° First, UEFA feared that smaller clubs and the system of 
developing young talent would be destroyed.91 UEFA claimed that 
small clubs were kept afloat by the money which filtered down to them 
from the large clubs as compensation for training and developing 
younger players.92 John Reames, Chairman of Lincoln City (a small 
club), argues that "as many as 35 [small clubs] will go out ofbusiness."93 
Absent the transfer fee system, young players would be able to receive 
training from a smaller team and progress to a larger team with little 
compensation being paid to the smaller team.94 
UEFA's second reason for hesitating to abolish the transfer fee sys-
tem was the fear that an artificial transfer system would be created.95 
Because the Bosman ruling does not apply to transfers wholly within a 
single EU country, UEFA was afraid of a system in which teams would 
make arrangements with foreign teams for the purpose of funneling 
trades through foreign teams to avoid paying transfer fees on player 
trades between local teams.96 Therefore, third parties would become 
involved in local player trades for the sole purpose of avoiding domes-
tic transfer fees. 97 
86 See Commission on CoUision Course With UEFA Over Bosman Ruling, supra note 10. 
87 Philippe Naughton, FIFA and UEFA Say No Rule Changes this Season, Reuters Newswire Serv., 
Dec. 22, 1995. 
88 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 135. 
89 EuROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICE, UEFA Accepts Bosman Ruling on Foreign Players, EuR. REP., 
Feb. 21, 1996. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. Smaller clubs obtain money in the transfer fee system through the sale of players to 
larger clubs. The smaller clubs serve as 'farm' clubs by providing training for young players. When 
a player is obtained by a larger club, the smaller club receives a transfer fee as compensation for 
the training. Id. 
93 Martin Thorpe, The Bosman Verdict: The Club, GuARDIAN, Dec. 16, 1995, at 19. 
94 See id. 
95 See Naughton, supra note 87. 
96Jd. 
97 See id. 
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UEFA also resisted the elimination of the foreign player limitations.98 
UEFA claimed that if it was forced to eliminate the foreign player 
limitation during its regional tournament, the integrity of the tourna-
ment would be jeopardized.99 It claimed, "it is in the interests of con-
tinuity and fairness in every sporting competition that the regulations 
of the competition are not changed during the course of the compe-
tition. "1oo 
On january 19, 1996, the European Commission sent a formal warn-
ing letter to UEFA which threatened that if it did not abide by the 
Bosman ruling within six weeks, serious fines would be imposed against 
it.101 Karl Van Miert, EU Commissioner of Competition, had rejected 
UEFA's arguments and was seeking to enforce the ruling. 102 The com-
missioner cited the need to apply the EU competition law in a consis-
tent and timely manner.103 On March 4, 1996, UEFA agreed to follow 
the Bosman rulings. 104 
Though UEFA publicly accepted the Bosman ruling, it continued to 
maintain a degree of animosity toward it. 105 The Secretary General of 
UEF A, Gerhard Aigner, spoke negatively of the effects the Bosman 
ruling will have on football. 106 Aigner asserted that two classes of society 
would be created in football, the "haves" and the "have-nots."107 Aigner 
argued that football would be divided into teams who can afford to 
purchase top quality players and those who cannot. 108 He went on to 
argue that the ruling threatens the future of the national structures 
and national football associations as the need to develop local players 
will be lost.109 
Van Miert responded to Aigner's argument by stating that the need 
to uphold EU law is paramount. 110 He then called for cooperation 
98 Richard Weekes, Player Power; Domestic transfer system facing legal onslaught; Footbal~ TIMES 
(London),Jan. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6469251. 
99 See Naughton, supra note 87. 
100 /d. 
101 Wolf, supra note 11, at 18. 
102 EuROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICE Van Miert Scolds UEFA fur Predicting Post-Bosman Chaos, 
Eur. Rep., March 23, 1996. 
I03 Van Miert and Flynn Lay Down the Law fur UEFA, supra note 10. 
104 See Bates, supra note 12. 
105 See Van Miert Scolds UEFA fur Predicting Post-Bosman Chaos, supra note 102. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109Jd. 
no See Van Miert Scolds UEFA fur Predicting Post-Bosman Chaos, supra note 102. 
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between the big and small football clubs. 111 In order to protect small 
clubs from destruction resulting from the loss of transfer fees, Van 
Miert suggested the creation of a program which would allow for the 
equal distribution of money from endorsements, television rights and 
merchandising to all clubs.112 He claimed that this program would help 
"fill the void left by the transfer fee. "113 
III. ANALYSIS 
The ECJ declined to answer the question of whether the transfer fee 
system or the foreign player limitations violated EU competition law.114 
The court's action raises two questions that will be addressed in the 
remainder of this note: ( 1) does the Commission or the Commissioner 
of Competition have the authority to threaten a party regarding an 
issue the ECJ chose to avoid? and (2) do Articles 85 and 86 apply to 
the practices of UEFA and the various national associations? 
A. Commission's Authority 
Regulation 17 authorizes the Commission to bring an end to any 
infringement of Articles 85 or 86.115 The Commission's power is limited 
by possible judicial review by the ECJ. 116 Along with its role in judicial 
review, the ECJ also rules on preliminary questions regarding interpre-
tation of the treaties.117 In Bosman, the ECJ's ruling on the preliminary 
questions put before it relied solely on Article 48.118 The tragic flaw in 
Bosman was that Article 48 did not provide the Commission with the 
power to enforce the ruling because Article 48 vests no authority to 
fine transgressors.119 The Commission, in order to strengthen its threat 
against UEFA, applied competition law, enabling it to fine violators up 
to ten percent of their annual turnover and impose daily fines if the 
undertaking fails to comply with the Commission's order. 120 Therefore, 
though the court found that UEFA and the national football associa-
Ill See id. 
112Jd. 
113 Id. 
114 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134; Perry, supra note 13. 
115Regulation 17, supra note 43, at C4-014. 
116 Id. at C4-046. 
117 RITTER, supra note 18, at 5. 
118 Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 136. 
119Perry, supra note 13. 
!20 Regulation 17, supra note 43, at C4-040; see Perry, supra note 13. 
1998] COMPETITION LAw 179 
tion's practices violated EU law under Article 48, the insufficiency of 
the enforcement mechanisms of the relevant articles reduced the 
court's narrow holding to a paper tiger. 121 
The ECJ's decision not to rule on the applicability and enforcement 
of Article 85 and 86 served as a de facto relegation of this authority to 
the Commission.122 It is the belief of this author that the ECJ's failure 
to address all the issues before it in Bosman created two major proce-
dural shortcomings: inefficiency and legal instability. 
The ECJ serves as the final arbiter of EU law.123 By failing to rule on 
Articles 85 and 86, the ECJ undermined its role as a court of finality.124 
Rather than provide a clear interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, it 
passed the issue to the Commission.125 Therefore, the Commission was 
put in the position of deciding if UEFA and the national football 
association's actions violated EU law.126 Any dispute arising from the 
Commission's subsequent actions must be brought before the courts 
for a second time.127 
The court serves as the interpreter of treaties. 128 In Bosman, the court 
resisted this obligation.129 While the Commission does have the author-
ity to end violations of Articles 85 and 86,130 it is the ECJ's role to 
determine the meaning of these Articles.131 The inability of the court 
to make a decision leaves the issue unresolved. The instability is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the advocate-general also provided an 
opinion on the issue.132 In the present case the advocate-general held 
that UEFA and the national football associations had violated Article 
85, but not Article 86.133 Therefore, by not ruling on an issue, the ECJ 
creates the opportunity for a split in opinions between the advocate-
121 Perry, supra note 13. 
122See Regulation 17, supra note 43, at C4-014. Regulation 17, Article 3 states,"[w]here the 
Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds that there is infringement of 
Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings or associations 
of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end." /d. 
123 See RITTER, supra note 18, at 6. 
124 See id. 
125 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134-36. 
126 See Regulation 17, supra note 43, at C4-014. 
127 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 52, at 136. 
128 See 'TREATY oF RoME, supra note 7, at 76-77. 
129 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 134. 
ISO See Regulation 17, supra note 43, at C4-0 14. 
131 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 7, at art. 76-77. 
132 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 54. 
133 See id. at 118. 
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general and the Commission with no reasonable means to resolve the 
split other than a rehearing of the case. 
B. Article 85 
Article 85 is applicable to agreements between enterprises which 
may affect trade between Member States.134 An "enterprise" is defined 
as any entity engaged in business activities.135 The receipt of millions 
of dollars yearly through television contracts, marketing agreements, 
and ticket sales make UEFA and the national football associations a 
part of the multi-billion dollar sports entertainment business.136 There-
fore, to the extent that UEFA and the national football associations 
are engaged in business activities, they are considered enterprises as 
defined by the EU. 137 
The second requirement for the application of Article 85 is the 
presence of an "agreement between undertakings. "138 An agreement 
exists if two or more parties reach a consensus between themselves, or 
through a third party, which dictates their actions.139 The mere exist-
ence of an association demonstrates an agreement between its mem-
bers to abide by common rules.140 
The third requirement for the application of Article 85 is that the 
agreement has an appreciable effect on trade between Member 
States.141 The transfer system affects trade by creating an artificial bar-
rier to trade which encourages the preservation of the present market 
situation.142 The transfer system skews the market by giving the original 
club an unfair advantage over all other competitors.143 This advantage 
results in unbalancing the natural market forces of supply and demand 
to favor the original club.144 Therefore, the general trade in players is 
inhibited.145 
134 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
135 See RITTER, supra note 18, at 31. 
136 See Morning Edition, supra note 2; Lansley, supra note 3, at 31. 
157 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48; Lansley, supra note 3, at 31. 
138'fREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
139 See RITTER, supra note 18, at 60. 
140 See Alan Tomlinson, Nurth and South: the Rivalry of the FootbaU League and the FootbaU 
Association, in BRITISH FoOTBALL AND SociAL CHANGE: GETTING INTO EuROPE, 25, 26 Uohn 
Williams and Stephen Wagged. 1991). 
141 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47-48; RITTER, supra note 18, at 81. 
142 See Perry, supra note 13. 
14~ See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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UEFA, as the governing body of European Football, oversees the 
rules and trades in all fifteen member states. 146 Because of the large 
numbers of teams and players and the fact that trading players is 
common, it is a common practice for players to move from clubs 
located in one country to teams located in another country. 147 There-
fore, the trading of players between clubs affects trade between Mem-
ber States. 148 
In addition, foreign player restrictions limit the number of foreign 
players a team may field, which drastically reduces the demand for 
foreign players. 149 Thus, players who otherwise would satisfY the de-
mands of a team are not able to take advantage of this need because 
the players do not have access to the market. 150 The limitations placed 
on foreign players forces them to remain in their native country.151 This 
inhibits the functioning of the market system by enabling domestic 
clubs to pay lower wages to native players because of the players' 
inability to compete for jobs in other Member States. 152 
CONCLUSION 
Application of Regulation 17 demonstrates that the Commission has 
the authority to bring an end to any violations of Article 85 or 86. The 
court's failure to address the competition law issue served only to 
muddle the adjudication of this issue. By not ruling on the competition 
issue, the court placed the burden of interpreting the competition law 
in the hands of the Commission. In order to create more unified laws, 
the ECJ should answer all questions placed before it regarding treaty 
interpretation. Adherence to this guideline would create more unified 
laws in the EU, which would in turn enhance the development of the 
common market. 
In Bosman, strict application of Article 85 demonstrates that UEFA 
and the national football associations may be viewed to have violated 
this law. Through agreements codified in their rules, UEFA and the 
national football associations unnaturally influenced trade between 
Member States by controlling the flow of labor. The impact of these 
146 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 119. 
147 See id. at 53. 
148 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 7, at 47; Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 111. 
149 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 133. 
150 See id. 
151 See Perry, supra note 13. 
152 See Bosman, 1996 CEC(CCH) at 133. 
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restrictions directly conflicts with the objectives of the Treaty of Rome 
and the EU competition law. 
Patrick Closson 
